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GROUP INFLUENCE ON INDIVIDUAL RISK TAKING
Abstract
Does group interaction lead to greater conservatism or to greater risk
taking in decisions than would obtain were the decisions arrived at individ-
trally--or is there an averaging effect? This question was investigated
with a procedure in which the protagonist in each of 12 everyday life
situations must choose between two courses o~ action, one of which in-
volves considerably more risk than the other but also is much more reward-
ing if successful. The S must decide on the lowest level of probability
for the success of the risky alternative that he would deem sufficient to
warrant its choice.
A total of 218 liberal arts university students participated in the
study. In the experimental condition, the ~s first arrived at individual
decisions concerning each of the 12 situations; then, the~r were brought
together in discussion groups of six with the request that they reach a
group consensus on each decision; and afterward, they were asked to make
all their decisions privately once again. Some £s also made private deci-
sions yet another time two to six ,.reeks later. The group members! judgments
of one another's relative degrees of influence and of popularity within the
group also were obtained. There were 14 all-male and 14 all-female groups.
'In the control condition, Sa made their decisions individually each of two
times with one week intervening, under instructions the second time that
encouraged them to change rather than simply to recall their earlier deci-
sions.
It was found that (1) group decisions exhibit greater risk taking than
appears in pre-discussion individual decisions; (2) post-discussion private
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decisions exhibit the same increase in risk taking as occurs in the group
decisions; (3) the increase in risk taking resulting from the discussion
process is still maintained after a subsequent period of two to six weeks
has el~ped; (4) nO shift in risk taking level occurs over time in the
absence of the discussion process; and (~) degree of risk taking in
pre-discussion individual decisions and degree of judged ini'luence with-
in the group are positively related. Two interpretations of these findings
were suggested, either or both of which may apply: (1) the knowledge that
one's decisions are being made jointly with others leads to a diffusion
of personal responsiblity, the outcome of which is an increased willing-
ness to take risks; (2) high risk takers are more likely to take the in-
itiative in social situations> with the result that they become more in-
fluential in the group.
GROUP INFLUENCE ON INDIVIDUAL RISK TAKINGl
What are the effects of group interaction on risk and conservatism
in decision making? By risk and conservatism we mean the extent to which
the decision maker is willing to expose himself to possible failure in
the pursuit of a desirable goal. Consider the situation in which several
individuals working separately arrive at a series of decisionsf and then
are brought together to arrive at a group consensus regarding those deci-
sions. What relationship should one expect to find between the individual
decisions and the group consensus?
On the basis of prior experimental studies of individual and group
judgment (e.g., Schachter, 1951; see also the section on group pressures
and group standards, pp 0 165-341, in Cartwright & Zander, 1960), '..re should
predict an averaging effect, i.e., group decisions randomly distributed
around the average of the pre-discussion individual decisions. Such an
effect would seem to imply a process of minimizing individual losses,
or minimizing the maximum individual concession. The cited studies re-
port that inducements toward compromise and concession seem to be exerted
most strongly toward group members whose initial individual views are most
deviant from the central tendency.
An equally, if not more, compelling alternative hypothesis is -that
the group discussion will lead to increased conservatism, relative to the
average of the prior individual decisions. One may cite the observations
of Whyte (1956), among others, concerning the outcomes of conferences and
meetings in bureaucratic organizations. Ttlhyte argues that the use of
committees and teams in the management of business and other kinds of
enterprises leads inexorably to an inhibition of boldness and risk taking,
a concentration on the conservative course when a choice must be made
-2-
between more and less risky courses of action. How are such effects to
be explained? First, it may be that the very nature of the group process
or atmosphere encourages such a trend: there may be a fear, for example,
of appearing foolhardy to others~ Alternatively, or in addition, it is
possible that the mechanism underlying .an increase in conservatism is one
of greater influence being exerted within the group by members whose in-
dividualconservatism tendencies are stronger. These two interpretations
are not incompatible, of course, since the group process, if encouraging
of conservatism, will enhance the influence of the initially more con-
servative members.
Finally, consideration should be given to the remaining and least
likely possibility--that group interaction will eventuate in increased
risk taking relative to the average of the prior decisions of the group
me:mbers working separately. In this regard, Osborn (1957) has reported
that group interaction may lead to quite radical, bold, problem solutions.
vlliile Osborn claims that special conditions must exist if such effects are
to be observed, attempts to produce such conditions experimentally (Taylor,
Berry, & Block, 1958) have yielded no evidence whatever for the so-called
"brainstormingll phenomenon. Thibaut and Kelley (1959, pp. 267-268) discuss
the conflicting evidence on this issue. We might, in passing, also men-
tion mass or crowil phenomena, in which extreme actions taken by groups are
well beyond the capacities of the members of such groups considered 1n-
diVid.ually (Brown, 1954; Turner & Killian, 1957). The relevance of such
mass phenomena to group decision making in a laboratory context, however,
is probably quite remote. In sum, increased risk taking as a consequence
of group interaction appeared to us to be the least feasible of the three
possibilities discussed above.
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An examination of the literature reveals little experimental re-
search which addresses itself explicitly to the problem of the present
investigation. Lonergan and McClintock (1961) report that membership
in an interdependent group led to no significant move toward greater
conservatism or risk taking in a betting situation involving monetary
gain or loss. Since the group situation was so structured that a con-
sensus was not required, however, this experiment is not directly relevant
to the aims of the present study. Hunt and Rowe (1960) report no dif-
ference between three-person groups and individuals in riskiness of in-
vestment decisions. HOi{eVer, the brevity of the group interaction (15
minutes) and the disruptive influence of having the various gr'oups meet
within sight of each other in a large room render their results incon-
clusive. Atthowe (1961), comparing individual and dyadic decisions in
the choice of the better of two alternative wagers, found greater con-
servatism in the dyadic decisions. But the relevance of this result to
the problem at hand is called into question when we learn that the al-
ternative wagers iofere presented to the §.S as "problems taken f'rom the
mathematical reasoning section of an advanced intelligence test and ar-
ranged as 'wagers" (p. 115).. This could well contribute to a conservative
strategy.
We turn, finally, to a study by Stoner (1961), which provides the
starting point for the research to be reported. Using male graduate
students of industrial management as ~s) Stoner observed that a group
consensus regarding degree of risk to be taken in resolving a "life
dilemma" situation deviated from the average of pre-discussion decisions
in the direction of greater risk taking. These results took us by sur-
prise. We wondered whether the finding could be generalized to other
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subject populations, whether it was an enduring effect, and whether it
might have anything to do with relationships between risk taking and per-
ceived group influence.
One issue that arises in interpreting stoner's study concerns the ef-
fect that expectations about one's role might have on the results. Thus,
a group of male graduate students of industrial management might make more
risky decisions gua group than would each such student individually--the
result obtained by Stoner--becausB the presence of their peers reminds
each that one of the positively sanctioned attributes of the business
manager role which they occupy or aspire to occupy is a willingness to
take risks in their decision making. Stoner's use of a male business
school sample,- therefore, leaves open the possibility that his results
may be a function of this particular group's self-assigned professional
role alone. It also is possible that a group of males, regardless of'
their professional role, might make more risky decisions when gathered
together because the presence of other males serves as a reminder that
one of the expected indications of manliness in our society is a willing-
ness to be bold and daring in decision making. Conversely, a group of
females might make more conservative decisions when gathered together,
or at least might fail to shift in a risky direction, since risk taking
tendencies are not likely to be mutually reinforced in groups for whom
risk is not a positive social value (see, e.g., Komarovsky, 1950; Milner,
1949; Wallach & Caron, 1959).
In the present experiment, 'He shall employ samples of male and female
undergraduates enrolled in a liberal arts curriculum at a large state
university. If the effects observed by Stoner are found to hold for
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both of the above samples, this would constitute strong evidence for the
generality of the phenomenon and its independence of occupational and
sex role considerations. Furthermore, the use of previously unacquainted
sUbjects whose ascribedstatu8 is initially equal will insure that what-
ever effects are obtained cannot be attributed to an association between
initially high or low status, on the one hand, and risk or conservatism,
on the other. If initial status levels were unequal, low status in-
dividuals might simply adopt the standards of those whose status is high--
an outcome which would tell us nothing about the effect of group inter-
actional processes as such on individual risk taking.
One shOuld distinguish initially ascribed status from status indices
(e.g., perceived influence and popularity) derived from the group experience.
Since such indices may bear some relation to initial risk taking level, the
necessary sociometric-type judgments will be obtained.
Fip..ally, evidence will -be pre sented ,vith regard to the following t,m
questions.: Is the group-induced effect on risk-taking limited only to
the group member's overt compliance in the group setting or does it also
extend to his covert acceptance when he makes post-group decisions as an
individual (see Festinger, 1953j Kelley &Thibaut, 1954)7 To what extent
are group effects on individual decision making relatively enduring or
Short-lived?
Method
Assessment of Level of Conservatism or Risk Takin~
The instrument used for assessing level of conservatism or risk
taking, as developed in some of our prior research (Wallach & Kogan,
1959, 1961; Kogan &Wallach, 1961), is called an Ilopinion questionnaire ll
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and contains descriptions of twelve everyday life situations. The central
person in each situation must choose between two courses of' action, one
of which is more risky than the other but also more rewarding if success-
f'ul. For each situation the S must indicate the lowest probability of
success he would accept before recolmllending that the potentially more
rewarding alternative be chosen. The probabilities listed are 1, 3, 5,
7, and 9 chances of success in 10} plus a final category (scored as 10)
in which S can refuse to recommend the risky alternative no matter how
high its likelihood of success.
The situations were so designed as to cover a wide range of content}
and may be summarized as follows:
L An electrical engineer may stick with his present job at a modest
but adequate salary, or may take a new job offering considerably more money
but no long term security.
2. A man with a severe heart ailment must seriously curtail his
customary way of life if he does not undergo a delicate medical operation
which might cure him completely or might prove fatal.
3. A II1aJl of moderate means may invest some money he recently in-
herited in secure "blue-chip" low-return securities or in more risky
securities that offer the possibility of large gains.
4. A calltain of a college football team} in the final seconds of a
game with the college's traditional rival, may choose a play that is
almost certain to produce a tie score} or a more risky play that would
lead to sure victory if successful, sure defeat if not.
5. The p_resident of an American corporation which is about to ex-
pand may build a new plant in the United States where returns on the
investment would be moderate, or may decide to build in a foreign
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country with an unstable political history where, however, returns on
the investment would be very high.
6. A college senior planning graduate work in chemistry may enter
university X where, because of rigorous standards, only a fraction of the
graduate students manage to receive the Ph.D., or may enter university
Y which has a poorer reputation but where almost every graduate student
receives the Ph.D.
7. A low-ranked participant in a national chess tournament, playing
an early match with the top-favored man, has the choice of attempting or
not trying a deceptive but risky maneuver which might lead to quick vic-
tory if successful or almost certain defeat if it fails.
8. A college senior with considerable musical talent must choose
between the secure course of going on to medical school and becoming a
physician, or the risky course of embarking on the career of a concert
pianist.
9. An ft~erican prisoner-of-war in World War II must choose between
possible escape with the risk of execution if caught, or remaining in the
camp '''here privations are severe.
10. A successful businessman 1tlith strong feelings of civic respon-
sibilitymust decide whether or not to run for Congress on the ticket of
a minority party whose campaign funds are limited.
11. A research physicist, ,just beginning a five-year appointment at
a university, may spend the time working on a series of short-term
problems which he would be sure to solve but which would be of lesser
importance, or on a very important but very difficult problem with the
risk of nothing to show for his five years of effort.
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12. An engaged couple must decide, in the face of recent arguments
suggesting some sharp differences of opinion, whether or not to get lnar-
ried. Discussions with a marriage counselor indicate that a happy mar-
riage, while possible, would not be assured.
The response categories are arrayed from chances of one in 10 up-
ward for the odd items and in the reverse order for the even items, thus
counterbalancing for any possible order preference effect in choice of
probability levels. An overall conservatism-risk taking score is derived
by adding the scores for the separate items. The larger this score, the
greater ~'s conservatism.
Our prior research, cited above, yielded split-half Spearman-Brown
reliability coefficients ranging from -53 to .80 for various age and sex
samples, suggesting that the instrument possesses satisfactory internal
consistency. The results of the present experiment will provide evidence,
furthermore, of high test-retest reliability.
Regarding the instrument's construct validity as a risk taking measure,
our earlier studies, cited above, have yielded findings consistent with a
risk taking interpretation. For example, degree of conservatism as
measured with the present instrument increases with age from young adult-
hood to old age for both males and females, and increases with degree of
subjective probability of personal failure in a motor skill game with
actual motor skill controlled.
The ExperD~ental Condition
Subjects. The Ss were invited to participate in an experiment which
would take no longer than two hours and for which remuneration would be
provided. Six ~s were scheduled for anyone time, with every effort being
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made to insure that previously acquainted persons were not signed up for
the same session. A total of 167 Ss participated in the experimental
condition~-14 all-male groups and lLt all-female groups.2 The Ss were
liberal arts students enrolled in summer session courses at the University
of Colorado in Boulder.
Pre-discussion individual decisions. The experiment was run in a
seminar room around a very long table. For the initial administration
of the questionnaire, Ss took alternate seats with E at one end. The six
~s were requested to read the instructions to the questionnaire and to
look over the first item. The E then emphasized two points in further
standard instructions: (1) that the more risky alternative is always
assumed to be more desirable than the safer course, if the former should
prove successful; (2) that the odds which S marks indicate the lowest
odds £ would be willing to take and still advise the central figure to
give the risky alternative a try. The Ss were told there was no time
limit, that they should consider each of the 12 situations carefully, and
that they could return to an earlier question if they wished to. The
conservatism-risk instrl®ent then was filled out individually by each
of the six Ss in a group administration session that took about 20
minutes 0 To avoid giving any of the £s the feeling that they were being
rushed, the questionna~res were not collected until all had finished.
Group discussion and consensual group decisions. Without having had
any prior expectation that they would be requested to discuss their deci-
sions, the six S8 were then asked to move together into a discussion group
at one end of the table. They now each were given another copy of the
questionnaire, and a stand-up cardboard placard with the identification
letter K, L, M, N, 0, or P on it was placed before each S. The E then
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told them that the questionnaire now before them was the same one they
just finished taking. They had taken it, he continued, to familiarize
them with all the situations and to give them some idea where they might
stand on each. Now he wanted the group to discuss each question in turn
and arrive at a unanimous decision on each. This time they could not
return to a question} but rather had to discuss each one until the group
decision was reached before going on to the next. When the group reached
its decision on a question, all Ss were to mark it on their questionnaires
in order to have a record. The group would be completely on its own, E
not participating in the discussion at all.
The E then retired to the other end of the table in order to be as
far from the group as possible. A question that often arose before discus-
sion had started was what to do if a deadlock occurs. The Ers standard
reply was: "Most groups are able to come to some decision if those who
disagree will restate their reasons, and if the problem is re-read care-
fully." Most groups succeeded in reaching a unanimous decision on most
items, although an occasional deadlock did occur on one or another itenl.
The group discussions ,.,ere of such a nature as to indicate that the
participants were highly involved in the decision tasks.
Post-discuss~on individual decisions. After the discussion was over,
E proceeded to ask the group members to spread apart for some further in-
dividual work and to take their questionnaires and identification placards
with them. In standard instructions, he requested them to go back over
the situations and indicate their own present personal decisions with a
"P." He noted that while in some cases the ~s may have agreed vrith the
group decision, in other cases they may have disagreed with it. In the
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former cases the lip" "would be placed on the same line as the check mark;
in the latter cases, on a different line.
'~{hile the consensual decisions by the group 'would indicate the public
effect of the discussion process, the private post-discussion decisions
made once again on an individual basis would indicate whether the discus-
sion process had influenced covert acceptance as well as public com-
pliance.
Rankings for influence and popularity. After the post-discussion in-
dividual decisions had been made, a ranking sheet was passed out to each
~ requesting that he rank everyone in the group (identified by their let-
ter placards), including himself, in terms of ho"w much each influenced the
final group decision. Then each S was requested to rank everyone in the
group (except, of course, himself) in terms of how much he would like to
become better acquainted with each.
The rankings for influence provided the information needed for
examining possible relationships between strength of individua~ risk
taking or conservatism tendencies, on the one hand, and degree of in-
fluence in the group, on the other. If such relationships existed, it
seemed to be of interest to determine whether they were specific to per-
ceived influence or would prove to be dependent upon ~rs popularity; hence
the second set of rankings.
Secrecy instructions. After the rankip~ sheets were collected, ~
told the group that the re search i{Quldbe carried out in coming ,oreeks,
and that they could now appreciate why it would be important for the
content of the experiment to be kept secret, since a person who even
knew that the group would be discussing the same questions 'olhich he
had filled out individually would have a tendency to mark logically
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defensible answers instead of his true opinion, etc. The Ss therefore
all were sworn to secrecy. Various indications suggest that this pledge
was faithfully kept.
Post-past-discussion individual decisions. A further session of in-
dividual decision making took place approximately two to six weeks later
for some Ss. These £s individually were given the conservatism-risk
questionnaire a third time and were asked to reconsider the situations.
The standard instructions emphasized that E was not interested in testing
S r s memory, but rather w"anted £ truly to reconsider each situation. 'rhe
instructions thus oriented the Ss away from simply trying to recall their
prior decisions. Each S was paid for this further work.
The Control Condition
Subjects. Control ~s were obtained in the same way as the experi-
mental ~s, and likewise received remuneration for their work. The controls
were signed up to participate in two sessions: the first to last about 20
minutes; the second, exactly one VTeek later, to last about 15 minutes.
A total of 51 £s participated in the control condition--2Lj. males and
27 females. Like the experimental ~s, tlle controls ,,,ere liberal arts
students enrolled in summer session courses at the University of Colorado
in Boulder.
First individual decision session. The first session was identical
to the pre-discussion individual decision part of the experimental condi-
tion. Fr~m six to eight ~s of the same sex, scheduled for the same time,
filled out the conservatism-risk instrument while sitting together in
physical conditions identical to those of the experimental £s and at ap-
proximately the same time of day as the experimental ~s had worked.
-13-
Exactly the same instructions were provided as had been given the ex-
perimental ~s.
After the first session, the control ~s were sworn to secrecy. They
also were told that they would be taking a similar questionnaire the
next week, and that it was extremely important that they not discuss
it with one another nor with anyone else, since such discussion might
affect the way they filled out next week's questionnaire.
Second individual decision session. The same control Ss who had
participated in a particular first individual decision session came back
exactly one week later. After checking that no discussion had taken place
in the intervening week among the controls, ~ handed out new copies o~
the questionnaire and explained that this questionnaire was identical to
the one taken last week. Each S ·vlas requested to go back over the situa-
tions and reconsider them, ~ emphasizing that he was not interested in
testing ~IS memory but rather wanted ~ truly to reconsider each situation.
The instructions were so designed, therefore, as to dissuade ~ from as-
suming that the most socially acceptable thing to do would be to try to
make the same decisions that he had made a week ago. Change was encouraged
rather than discouraged. Control Ss were sworn to secrecy again at the
end o~ the second session.
Results
Consensual Group Decisions Compared with Pre-Discussion Individual Decisions
Tables 1 and 2 examine, for male and female groups respectively,
the signi~icance of the conservatism difference between the mean of the
pre-discussion individual decisions made by the members of each group and
that groupls consensual decisions. The basic test is carried out usir~
-14-
------------------------~--------------------
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
the total conservatism score, which consists o~ all 12 item scores com-
bined. Tests also are carried out for each item separately.
In the case of the total score, a group's difference score is the
sum of the 12 unanimous group decision scores minus the average of the
pre-discussion total individual decision scores for the six members. 3
Since larger scores indicate greater conservatism, a negative difference
(or score decrease) indicates a shift in the risky direction. A t test
is used to determine whether the 14 difference scores for the groups of
each sex are significantly different ~rom zero (McNemar, 1955, pp. 108-
109).4 These total score data indicate a move in the risky direction
significant beyond the .001 level for the 14 male groups, and a move in
the risky direction significant beyond the .005 level for the 14 female
groups. Furthermore, the degree of shift is not significantly different
for the two sexes.
In the case of the scores for a single item, a group's difference
score consists of the unanimous group decision on that item minus the
average of the pre-discussion individual decision scores on that item
for the six members. Once again a negative difference or score decrease
indicates a shift in the risky direction, and a ! test is applied to
determine whether the difference scores for all groups that reached a
unanimous decision on the item in question are significantly different
from zero. For both the male and female groups, we ~ind that 10 of the
12 items show shifts in the risky direction, seven o~ them signi~icant
in each case. Five of those seven are the same for both sexes. Only
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two items show any indication for either sex of not sharing in the general
shift toward greater risk taking: items 5 and 12. It should be noted
that these two items exhibited, in our previous research, the lowest
correlations with the overall risk-conservatism score, suggesting that
they are relatively impure measures of the psychological dimension being
tapped by the other 10 items.
In sum, the evidence from Tables 1 and 2 indicates a strong move
toward greater risk taking when groups arrive at unanimous decisions,
compared with the risk levels ventured by the same persons in pre-discussion
individual decisions. Furthermore, this move toward greater risk taking
obtains for females as well as for males.
A further question concerns the extent to which the risky shift
is consistent from one group to another. Consider one example of several
consistency tests that have been conducted, all of which yield highly
similar results. Suppose we define a group as showing a risky shift
from pre-discussion individual decisions to consensual group decisions
if the difference score for its total score, as defined above, is a
negative one. Fourteen out of 14 male groups and 12 out of 14 female
groups are found to move in the risky direction, both results being very
significant by a sign test. Such a finding demonstrates, therefore, that
the risky shift phenomenon is quite consistent across groups.
Post-Discussion Individual Decisions Compared with Pre-Discussion In-
dividual Decisions
In Tables 3 and 4 we present, once again for male and female groups
respectively, the significance of the difference between the mean of
the pre-discussion individual decisions and the mean of the post-
discussion individual decisions made by the members of each group.
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Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here
The basic test once again is provided by the total conservatism score,
but tests also are presented for each item separately.
For the total score, a groupts difference score consists of the
average of the post-discussion total individual decision scores for the
members minus the average of the pre-discussion total individual decision
scores for the same members. Negative difference scores again indicate
risky shifts, and a ! test is applied to determine whether the 14 dif-
ference scores for the groups of each sex are significantly different
from Zero. We find, once again, a shift in the risky direction significant
beyond the .001 level for the 14 male groups, and a risky shift significant
beyond the .005 level for the 14 female groups. As before, the degree of
shift is not significantly different for the two sexes.
Turning to the scores for each separate item, a group's difference
score consists of the average of the post-discussion individual decision
scores on that item minus the average of the pre-discussion individual
decision scores on that item. With a negative difference score indicating
a risky shift and a ! test applied to indicate whether the 14 difference
scores for each sex on an item are significantly different from zero, we
find that nine of the 12 items show separate significant shifts in the
risky direction for the male groups (With one additional item shifting
non-significantly in the same direction), and that eight of the 12 items
show separate significant shifts toward greater risk taking for the fe-
male groups (With two additional items shifting non-significantly in tha.t
direction). The eight items showing significant risky shifts for the
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females are among the nine showing significant risky shifts for the
males. Items 5 and 12 once again are the only ones for either sex
showing any indication of not sharing in the general shift toward
greater risk taking found in both sexes.
There is clear evidence, therefore, that post-discussion individual
decisions exhibit a strong move toward greater risk taking when con~ared
with pre-discussion individual decisions arrived at by the same persons,
and do so for both sexes. The group discussion process, in other words,
seems to have an effect on private attitudes (post-discussion individual
decisions) that is just as significant as its effect on publicly expressed
views (unanimous group decisions).
Once again we may inquire about the extent to which the risky shift
is consistent from group to group. Several consistency tests have been
carried out, all yielding highly similar results. As an example, suppose
we define a group as eXhibiting a shift in the risky direction from pre-
discussion to post-discussion individual decisions if the difference
score for its total score, as defined in this section, is a negative
one. Fourteen out of 14 male groups and 12 out of 14 female groups are
found to shift in the risky direction, both results being quite significant
by a sign test. Such a finding demonstrates, therefore, that the risky
shift phenomenon is qUite consistent across groups in regard to covert
acceptance as well as overt compliance.
Control Ss
To insure that the move toward greater risk taking just described
actually is a result of the group discussion process, we must turn to
the findings for the control Ss. The comparability of control and
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experimental £8 is indicated in Table 5. We note that, in the case both
of males and females, the experimental and control ~s have approximately
the same initial total conservatism scores, and also are approximately
the same in age. 5 Item-by-item comparisons of experimental and control
Ss of each sex on initial conservatism scores also were carried out and
show that controls and experimentals within sex obtain highly similar
scores.
---------------------------------------------
Insert Table 5 about here
In Tables 6 and 7 we present, for male and female control Ss re-
spectively, the significance of the difference between decisions made
during the first and the second sessions. It will be recalled that one
week intervened between these two sessions, and that instructions for
the second session requested the ~s not to try simply to remember what
they had marked before, but to reconsider their decisions. It is evident
that the total conservatism score shows no shift from first to second 8es-
sion for either sex. Turning to the separate tests carried out on each
Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here
item, we find that none of the 12 items shows a significant shift for
the males, and only one of the 12 items shows a significant shift for
the females. When no group discussion and achievement of group con-
sensus intervenes, then, there is no systematic shift toward greater
risk taking or greater conservatism, and this despite instructions that
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encourage shifts by emphasizing that we are not interested in the Ss'
memories.
The data for the control ~s also provide us with an opportunity for
determining the test-retest reliability of the conservatism-risk instrument,
with one week intervening and under instructions that encourage change
rather than constancy. For the 24 male £6, the product-moment correla-
tion coefficient between total conservatism. scores in the first and
second sessions is .78. For the 27 female £s, the same correlation
coefficient is .82. Test-retest reliability of the instrument, there-
fore, is quite high.
Pre-Discussion Risk Taking and Influence in the Group
Our data concerning perceived influence within the group consisted
in each individual's ranking of all group members, including himself, in
terms of how much each influenced the group's decisions. A first ques-
tion to ask of these influence rankings is: how consistent are they from
member to member within a group? To determine the degree of agreement
among a group's members in their rankings of one another for influence,
Kendall's coefficient of concordance (Siegel, 1956, pp. 229-238) was
applied to each group's influence rankings. If the members of a group
agree regarding who among themselves are more influential and who less
so, then }i will be significantly large. Table 8 presents<:the results
of these tests for all 28 groups. It is evident that agreement in in-
fluence rankings is quite high: the degree of agreement is significant
for all 14 of the male groups, and for 11 of the 14 female groups.
Insert Table 8 about here
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Given this high agreement among group members in their rankings of
one another for influence, an approximate overall estimate of degree of
influence for a given group member was obtained by averaging the in-
fluence ranks that had been assigned to that person by all members of
the group (including that person). The lower the average} the greater
that ~rs perceived influence (i.e.) the higher the assigned influence
ranks for that person). These average influence scores for the Ss of
each sex were correlated with the initial total conservatism scores
obtained by the same ~s. The resulting product-moment correlation coef-
ficients are shown in Table 9. They are significant beyond the .005 and
.05 levels for the 82 males and the 82 females respectively: persons
higher in initial risk taking are rated as having more influence on the
group decisions.
Insert Table 9 about here
Average popularity scores for each group member were constructed
by averaging the popularity rankings assigned by all the other members
of the group. We note in Table 9 that there emerges a very strong
relationship between this average popularity score and the average in-
fluence score for both the male and the female group members: persons
rated high in influence also tend to be rated high in popularity. This
general relationship has} of course, been known for some time (see, e.g.,
nor~wtiz, Lyons, &Perlmutter, 1951; Back, 1951; Tagiuri & Kogan, 1960),
so that our obtaining it here increases our confidence in the respective
measures being used to assess influence and popularity. It is further
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evident in Table 9, however, that degree of initial risk taking is not
related to degree of popularity within the group for either sex.
Finally, we also find from Table 9 that risk taking and influence
are significantly related for each sex when popularity ratings are held
constant. The partial correlation coefficients are significant beyond
the .01 and .02 levels for the males and females,respectively. It is
eVident, therefore, that the relationships obtained for both sexes
between degree of initial risk taking and degree of influence on group
decisions are not dependent upon members' popularity.
Maintenance of the Risky Shift Over a Subsequent Period of Time
An interesting further question concerns the extent to which the
shift toward greater risk taking, which we have found to result from
group discussion, is maintained over a subsequent period of time. We
were able to gather evidence on this point for males but not for females.
In the case of the former, but not in the case of the latter, a random
sample of Ss from the original groups could be obtained for further study.
The 22 males who were available for further work were approximately
evenly distributed among the 14 original male groups. After a time
interval of roughly two to six weeks had elapsed since the group ses-
sion, these ~s individually were given the conservatism-risk questionnaire
a third time, as described in the section on procedure.
The comparability of the random male sub-sample of 22 to the original
male experimental condition sample of 82 is evident from the following
data on total conservatism scores. The mean pre-discussion total con-
servatism score was 66.9 for the sa~ple of 82, and also was 66.9 for
the sub-sample of 22. The mean post-discussion total conservatism
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score, in turn, was 56.6 for the whole sample and 56.2 for the sub-sample.
The t test of the difference scores had yielded a t significant beyond
the .001 level (~ = 9.12) for the whole sample, and it also yielded a
t significant beyond the .001 level (~ = 4.70) for the sub-sample.
Turning now to the total conservatism scores obtained by this sub-
sample when they took the questionnaire again two to six weeks after the
group discussion (call these scores the "post-past-discussion" individual
decisions), the mean score is 54.6. The mean of the difference scores
obtained by subtracting each £I S pre-discussion total conservatism score
from his post-past-discussion total conservatism score is -12.3, with a
! test of these difference scores yielding a ! value of 4.92 (R < .001),
hence indicating a risky shift from the pre-discussion individual deci-
sions to the post-past-discussion individual decisions. The mean of the
difference scores obtained, in turn, by subtracting each SIS post-discussion
total conservatism score from his post-past-discussion total conservatism
score is only -1.6, and a ~ test of these difference scores is not sig-
nificant, hence indicating no further change from the post-discussion
individual decisions to the post-post-discussion individual decisions.
Item-by-item analyses tell the same story: the only significant item
shifts are risky ones, and they are as strong from pre-discussion to
post-past-discussion sessions as they are from pre-discussion to post-
discussion sessions.
In sum, the data available on the point indicate that the shift in
the risky direction found to occur as a result of the group discussion
process is maintained over a subsequent period of time.
-23-
Discussion and Conclusions
The following conclusions may be drawn from the preceding evidence:
1. Unanimous group decisions concerning matters of risk show a
shift toward greater risk taking when compared with pre-discussion in-
dividual decisions made by the same persons and concerning the same
matters. This holds for both sexes.
2. Post-discussion individual decisions that follow unanimous group
decisions exhibit the same kind of shift toward greater risk taking as
appears in the group decisions. This is the case for both sexes. Covert
acceptance as well as overt compliance thus are affected in the same man-
ner by the discussion process.
3. This shift toward greater risk taking as a result of the discus-
sion process is still maintained when two to six weeks have elapsed since
the discussion occurred. Evidence on this point was available only for
males.
4. No shift in risk taking level of individual decisions occurs over
time in the absence of the discussion process. This holds for both sexes.
5. There is a positive relationship between degree of risk taking
in pre-discussion individual decisions and the extent to which group
members are perceived by one another as influencing group decisions.
This relationship is specific to judgments of influence, in that it
obtains when judgments of popularity are held constant, and also no
relationship is found between pre-discussion individual risk taking
and the extent to which group members are judged to be popular. These
statements all hold for both sexes.
The present stUdy indicates, then, that group interaction and
achievement of consensus concerning decisions on matters of risk
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eventuate in a willingness to make decisions that are more risky than
those that would be made in the absence of such interaction. Further-
more, although initial ascribed status levels of the group members are
equal, it is found that persons with stronger individual risk taking
proclivities tend to become more influential in the group than persons
who are more conservative. Two alternative interpretations of these
findings can be suggested; one more group-centered, the other more person-
centered: (1) It is possible that there is at T,lork in these groups a
process of diffusion or spreading of responsibility as a result of
knowing that one's decisions are being made jointly with others rather
than alone. Increased willingness to take risk would eventuate from
this decreased feeling of personal responsibility. That initial risk
t~~ing and judged influence within the group are positively related
could well occur as a consequence of this process, since one of its
effects would be for the views of high risk takers to be given more
weight by the rest of the group. (2) Alternatively, the fact that
high risk takers exert more influence may be a cause of the group's
movement toward greater risk taking. It is possible that high risk
takers are also more likely to take the initiative in social situations.
Of course, these two interpretations are not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive. Both of them may contribute to' the group effect.
That females as well as males show the same change toward greater
risk taking as a result of the group interaction condition, and that
the samples of both sexes T..rere liberal arts university students, renders
it unlikely that the results can be explained on the basis of reinforce-
ment by others of one's expectation as to whether one's appropriate
role is to be more or less of a risk taker. We noted earlier that
-25-
stoner (1961) found a move toward greater risk taking in group as com-
pared to individual decision making by male graduate students of in-
dustrial management, and we pointed out that this result might be
accounted for in terms of the professional role that they had as-
signed themselves by becoming graduate students in a business school.
Presence of peers might be expected to increase the salience of their
business manager role, and a greater willingness to take risks in
decision making might well be perceived as one of the attributes of
that role. Such a role expectation interpretation is ruled out for the
present study, however, through our use of liberal arts students as Ss.
In addition, the possibility of explaining the results in terms of
males' perceiving their appropriate role as one of willingness to be
bold and daring, and being reinforced in this view by interaction with
other like-minded males, is ruled out by the present study's obtaining
the same results for females as for males. This outcome would not be
expected if the findings depended on sex-linked role expectations as
to whether one should be more risky or more conservative. This outcome
also, of course, rules out interpretation in terms of any possible sex-
linked differences in major fields of study.
That the group-induced move toward greater risk taking in individual
decisions is still maintained two to six weeks after the discussion,
provides evidence, incidentally, which supports Lewin's (1947) view
that "group carried" attitudinal changes maintain themselves (see also
Pelz, 1958).
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Footnotes
1. This research l-las supported by a grant (G-17818) from the National
Science Foundation. fA Master's thesis by J.A.F. Stoner at M.I,'l'.ls
School of Industrial Management, I'lith D.G. Marquis and M.A. ldallach
as faculty advisers, was instrumental in inspiring the present
investigation. We are greatly indebted to J.A.F. Stoner and D.G.
Marquis for their aid and advice, and to V. Raimy and M. Wertheimer
for facilities at the University of Colorado in Boulder. Thaw~s also
are due S. IvIessick and A. hyers for comments.
2. Of the 14 male groups, 13 contained six §,s each, and. one contained
five Ss. An S in one of the six-person male groups misunderstood
instructions for the pre-discussion individual decisions, so that
his decision scores were removed prior to analysis. All 14 of the
female groups contained six Ss each. An §. in each of t'fTO female groups
misunderstood instructions for the :pre-discussion individual decisions,
so that the decision scores of these two females were removed prior
to analysis.
3. Any deadlocked item is, of course, not included in either term for
the group in question.
4. All significance levels cited in this study are based on two-tailed
tests.
5. It might also be mentioned that, in confirmation of earlier findings
(Wallach & Kogan, 1959, 1961), there is no sex difference in initial
total conservatism scores for either the experimental or the control
Ss.
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Table 1
Significance of Conservatism Difference between Mean
of Pre-Discussion Individual Decisions for a Group's
Members and Group's Consensual Decision: Males
Mean
Item differencea
All combined -9.4
1 -1.0
2 -0.2
3 -1.1
4 -1.8
5 +0.1
6 -1.2
7 -2.0
8 -1.1
9 -1.0
10 -0.4
11 -1.1
12 +0.8
Number
of groupsb
14
14
14
13
13
13
13
14
10
13
12
11
t
6.46
< 1.00
2.19
6.18
< 1.00
3.35
9.6~
< 1.00
4.37
< .001
< .001
n.s.
< .05
< .001
n. s.
< .01
< .001
n.s.
< .01
n.s.
< .005
< .05
aIn Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7, a negative difference signifies a
risky shift, a positive difference signifies a conservative shift.
bIn Tables 1 and 2, number of groups for an item is less than 14 when
one or more groups deadlocked on that item. Any deadlocked item is, of
course, not included when calculating scores for all items combined.
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Table 2
Significance of Conservatism Difference between Mean
of Pre-Discussion Individual Decisions for a Group's
Hembers and Group I s Consensual Decision: Females
I-1ean Number
Item difference of groups t Eo
All combined -9·4. 14 3.91 < .005
1 -1.0 13 4.17 < .005
2 -0.6 14 1.65 n.s.
3 -0.4 14 1.12 n.s.
4 -1.4 14 2.60 < .025
5 +0·7 14 1.90 n.s.
6 -0.8 13 2.63 < .025
7 -2.0 12 3·21 < .01
8 -1.7 14 5·26 < .001
9 -0.8 12 1.19 n.s.
10 -1.5 13 3.18 < .01
11
-0·9 13 2.28 < .05
12 +0.6 6 2.00 n.s.
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Table 3
Significance of Conservatism Difference between Mean of
Pre-Discussion Individual Decisions for a Group's
Members and Mean of Post-Discussion Individual
Decisions for a Grouprs Members: Males
Hean Number
Item .difference of groups t Eo
All combined -10.4 14 9.12 <.001
1 -1.0 14 4.32 <.001
2 -0.6 14 2.87 <.02
3 -1.1 14 3.bl.j. <.01
4
-1.7 14 8.14 <.001
5 +0.1 14 <1.00 n.s.
6 -1.1 14 3·79 <.005
7 -1.8 14 7.80 <.001
8 -1.1 14 3.54 <.005
9 -1.1 14 3·99 <.005
10
-0·3 14 <1.00 n.s.
11 -0.8 14 4036 <.001
12 +0.1 14 <1.00 n.s.
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Table 4
Significance of Conservatism Difference between Mean of
Pre-Discussion Individual Decisions for a Groupts
Members and Mean of Post-Discussion Individual
Decisions for a Group's Members: Females
,··Mean Number
Item ·dffference of groups t E
All combined -8.2 14 3.67 <.005
1
-0·9 14 5.09 <.001
2
-0·7 14 2.67 <.02
3 -0.6 14 2.58 <.025
4 -1.4 14 3.40 <.005
5 +0.6 14 1.85 n.s.
6 -0.8 14 2.90 < .02
7 -1.7 14 3.56 <.005
8 -1.2 14 4.44 <.001
9 -0·5 14 < 1.00 n.s.
10
-0.7 14 1.95 n.s.
11
-0.9 14 2.89 < .02
12 +0.7 14 3.66 < .005
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Table 5
Comparability of Experimental and Control
Ss in Initial Conservatism and Age
Mean Initial Overall Conservatism
Males Females
Mean N Mean N
Experimenta.l §.S 66.9 82a 65.6 82a
Control Ss 68.3 24 64.6 27
t 0.41 0.34
E n.s. n.s.
Mean Age
Males Females
Mean N Mean N
Experimental Ss 20·7 82b 20.3 84
Control S6 21.0 24 20·7 27
t 0.41 0.67
~ n.s. n.s.
aInitial overall conservatism scores were available for 164 of the
experimental £s. See footnote 2 in text.
bOne §. forgot to list his age, and one group contained five rather
than six Ss.
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Table 6
Significance of Conservatism Difference between First
and Second Decisions by Male Control Ss
Mean Number
Item difference of Ss t g
All combined +1.5 24 <1.00 n.s.
1 +0.4 24 <1.00 n.s.
2
-0.3 24 <1.00 n.s.
3 +0.3 24 <1.00 n.s 0
4 +0.8 24 2.00 n.s.
5 -0.4 24 1.06 n.s.
6 0.0 24 <1.00 n.s.
7 +0.4 24 1.03 n.s.
8 +0.5 24 1.63 n.s.
9 -0.1 24 <1.00 n.s.
10 +0.1 24 <l.00 n... s.
11 +0.1 24 <1.00 n.s.
12 -0.4 24 1.42 n.s.
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Table 7
Significance of Conservatism Difference between First
and Second Decisions by Female Control Ss
Mean Number
Item difference of Ss t J2
All combined -2.2 27- 1.26 n.s.
1 -0.4 27 <1.00 n"s.
2 -0.2 27 <1.00 n.s.
3 -1.0 27 2.61 <.02
lj.
-0.4 27 1.12 nos.
5 -0·3 27 <1.00 n.s.
6 -0.2 27 <1.00 n.s.
7 0.0 27 <LOO n.s.
8 0.0 27 <1.00 n.s.
9 +0.2 27 <1000 n.s.
10 +0.3 27 1.03 n.s.
11
-0.3 27 <1.00 n. s.
12 +0.1 27 <1.00 n.s.
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Table 8
Degree of Agreement Among Group Members in
Rankings of One Another for Influence
(Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance)
Males Females
Group N W E Group N Ii E
-
1 6 .64 <.01 1 6 .85 <.01
2 6 .55 <.01 2 6 .61 <.01
3 6 .74 <.01 3 6 ·31 n.s.
4 6 .72 <.01 4 6
·79 <.01
5 6 .70 <.01 5 6 .47 <.01
6 6 ·50 <.01 6 6 .67 <.01
7 5 .56 <.05 7 6 .13 n.s.
8 6 .50 <.01 8 6 .59 <.01
9 6 .62 <001 9 6 .59 <.01
10 6 .66 <.01 10 6 .69 <.01
11 6 .66 <.01 11 6 .83 <.01
12 6
·55 <.01 12 6 .80 <.01
13 6 •51~ <.01 13 6 .70 <.01
14 6
·73 <.01 14 6 ·30 n.s.
-38-
Table 9
Product-Moment Correlations Among Initial
Conservatism, In~luence, and Popularitya
Initial overall
Males (~
r
;;; 82)b
E
Females (B ;;; 82)b
r E
risk taking and
i~luence
Initial overall
risk taking and
popularity
In~luence and
popularity
Initial overall
risk taking and
in~luence, popularity
cheld constant
·32
·72
·30
<.005
n.s.
<.001
<.01
.22
-.04
.28
<.05
n.s.
<.001
<.02
aSmall score values signi~y greater risk taking, greater in~luence, and
greater popularity.
bl~ile all influence and popularity scores are based'onthe 167 ~s in
the experimental condition, the correlations are based on the 164 of those
Bs ~or whom initial overall risk taking scores were available.
Cpartial correlation ooefficients.
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